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
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




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
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Map of SYRACUSE &c.



AN ATTEMPT
TO ASCERTAIN THE
POSITIONS OF THE ATHENIAN LINES
AND
THE SYRACUSAN DEFENCES,

AS DESCRIBED BY THUCYDIDES,
IN BOOKS VI. & VII. OF HIS HISTORY.

BY
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UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.



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AN ATTEMPT
TO ASCERTAIN
THE POSITIONS OF THE ATHENIAN LINES,

ERRATA.

On the Map, 1. *for ἀστυχισμα, read ἀστυχισμα.*

P. 11, line 4 from the bottom, *for through the city, read from the city.*

late been paid to this necessary part of a historian's and critic's duty, by studying the reports of modern travellers, there are still many doubtful points left unsettled, partly through vagueness in the descriptions of the original writers themselves, and partly from not thoroughly comprehending the meaning of the terms employed. I was particularly struck with this when examining the remarks of two of the most distinguished Editors of Thucydides (Goëller and Arnold) on the operations of the Athenian army before Syracuse, and the drawings they have given of the positions of

* The substance of this paper has been occasionally read in the Third Greek Class, when prelecting upon the 7th Book of Thucydides.

the hostile forces. It appeared to me that something more satisfactory might be obtained regarding the relative situations of the Athenian and Syracusan lines, than what these and other Editors had produced, by a strict examination of the historian's language, and the different localities in the neighbourhood of the city.

It is well known to philologists, that the Greek prepositions were originally employed to mark the *relative* positions of bodies towards each other, and that, in the bearings of places, they are generally used with an accurate distinction by the Greek writers, and by none more so than Thucydides. Commentators have frequently fallen into errors by not sufficiently attending to these distinctions: and I think I shall be able to show, in the course of the following remarks, that the two Editors above mentioned have failed in pointing out the true positions of the opposing armies, by paying too little attention to the precise meaning of the terms employed by the historian. There is no doubt an obscurity in some of Thucydides' descriptions: but this might have been expected, as he was not an eye-witness of the siege, and must have received the report from some of the parties engaged in it, less able than himself to describe places and events with minute accuracy. All that he had to do was to state the leading circumstances as they occurred, without giving any farther particulars of the nature of the ground, or the distance of places from each other, than was necessary for a general account of the operations of the contending armies. All that can be expected, therefore, in an attempt to determine the positions

of the Athenians and Syracusans at different periods of the siege, is merely an approximation to the truth. I have no doubt that a person on the spot, with Thucydides in his hands, notwithstanding the changes that have taken place since the siege, would be able to point out very nearly the positions of the lines of both armies; for, however the works of man may disappear and decay, the grand features of nature are imperishable: and these form frequent points of reference by the historian.

The scene of the principal operations of the two armies lay between the port called Trogilus, towards the north-west of the city (near which, at a short distance from Thapsus, the Athenians effected their second landing), across a part of the slope of Epipolæ, a hill overlooking the city, and downwards to the large harbour, near the low marshy ground in that quarter. If these lines had been completed, they would have formed a large segment of a circle, embracing the districts called Tyche and Temenites, and also a portion of the Marsh Lysimelia. The fortifications of Syracuse on the west were, at that period, carried a little below the Portus Trogiliorum, across the lower part of Tyche and Temenites, and terminated a short way above the docks at the large harbour; thus enclosing that part of the city called Acradina. The following description, kindly furnished to me by a literary friend,* will convey a distinct idea of the different quarters of the city:—"The position of ancient Syracuse is easily ascertained, as it was built

* George Forbes, Esq., Banker, Edinburgh.

on rising ground ; and its walls, 22 miles in circumference, may be traced all round the edge. The modern town occupies only the Island of Ortygia, containing, according to Barigny's statement, 18,000 inhabitants in 1787. Half a mile from the modern gate, that is, from the point where the island approaches the mainland, connected by a draw-bridge, a single granite pillar is shown, marking the site of the ancient forum. From this central point, looking north-east, we had Acradina on the right hand, and Neapolis on the left; Ortygia behind, and Tyche before us: beyond which, and in a north-west direction, at a distance of about five miles from the forum, the citadel of Epipolæ, answering exactly to the description of Thucydides: *τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν χωρίου ἀποκρήμνου τε καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς κειμένου. —μέχρι τῆς πόλεως ἐπικλινές τ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπιφανές πᾶν εἶσω*—B. VI. 96."

I shall pass over the first landing of the Athenians in the large harbour, and the subsequent battle, in which the Syracusans were defeated, as the Athenians soon after set sail for Catana, with the intention of wintering there, and recruiting their forces. During the winter, however, the Syracusans built a wall near the city, almost entirely fronting Epipolæ, and carried so far as to enclose the temple of Apollo Temenites, in order that, if they should not be able to keep the field, the Athenians would be obliged to form their lines at a distance from the city. In both Goëller and Arnold's map, the wall is carried round the whole of the district called Temenites, on the one side fronting Epipolæ, and on the other the Marsh. But this does not seem warranted by the expressions of Thucydides. His words

are: *ἡ εἰχιζὼν δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακούσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πρὸς τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τείχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς ὄρων.* VI. 75. This wall is afterwards called *προτείχισμα*, a front or outwork. If the historian had intended to describe this wall as carried from the city on the one side, looking towards Epipolæ, *round* the whole of the Temenites to the walls on the other at the great harbour, he would have used the compound verb *περιτείχιζον*. Besides, “*τὸν Τεμενίτην*” is not the whole of the district, but only the chapel or statue of Apollo with the sacred grove, which the Syracusans were anxious to secure within their lines, as he was the tutelary god of their city. Neither does it appear, from the expressions of the historian, that the Syracusans carried this wall from the city walls on either side. Thucydides uses the preposition *πρὸς* with the dative case, *πρὸς τῇ πόλει*, not *at* the city, but *fronting* the city at a short distance. If the Syracusans had carried this wall *from* the city, the expression would have been, as elsewhere, *ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι*. It seems to have been intended as an *out-post*, both to prevent the Athenians from carrying their line of circumvallation near the city; and as it was constructed opposite Epipolæ, it served also to guard the town from an attack in that quarter.

The Athenians sailed from Catana during the night, and landed about daybreak at a place nearly half-way between Thapsus and the modern Santa Panagia. Although the Syracusans were sensible that the city would be exposed to the greatest danger from an attack on that side, and had formed the design of guarding the descent from the heights,

yet they probably expected that the Athenians would most likely land their forces at the great harbour, as they had formerly done: and accordingly they were reviewing their troops on the banks of the Anapus, while the enemy were marching rapidly and unobserved up the heights, and soon gained the ascent at Euryelus, a broad ridge or knoll on the highest part of Epipolæ. My correspondent observes, "The modern villa of Belvidere is supposed to mark the position of Euryelus, and it commands a magnificent view of the surrounding country to Hybla inland and to Ætna on the north."

"Meanwhile," says Dr. Arnold, "the Syracusans, surprised by the sudden appearance of the Athenians on the heights, hastened from the banks of the Anapus to attack them. The Syracusans were defeated, and fell back into the city; and the Athenians, on the following day, after having ineffectually descended the slope of Epipolæ towards Syracuse, to try to provoke the enemy to battle, returned to their former position, and built a fort at Labdalum"—"on the highest part of the cliffs of Epipolæ," says Thucydides, "looking towards Megara."

After fortifying Labdalum, a fort evidently near the Latomæ or quarries, and leaving a garrison in it, the Athenians descended to Tyca or Tyche, which Dr. Arnold thinks is about the middle of the slope of Epipolæ, exactly south of Targetta; and here they first began their line of circumvallation on the northern side towards Trogilus. Thucydides says: *καὶ τῇ ὕστεραίᾳ οἱ μὲν ἐτείχιζον τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ πρὸς βορέαν τοῦ κύκλου τεῖχος. — ἐπὶ τὸν Τρώγιλον καλούμενον.* By ob-

serving the situation of Trogilus, and attending to the name of the place Tyca, it would appear that they began their line, not on the slope at all, but where the district called Tyca meets Epipolæ, on the ground towards the north, in the direction of Trogilus, and considerably lower down, in order that, as the historian says, their line might be as short as possible from the great harbour to the other sea. They apparently chose this position, both to secure the transport of provisions and other necessities from their fleet, which was still lying at Thapsus, and also to block up the Syracusans in that quarter. It will be necessary to keep this position in mind, in order to ascertain as nearly as possible the place and direction of the two counterworks of the Syracusans, which, I apprehend, have been very much misunderstood by all the commentators on Thucydides. The first of these the historian calls *an under wall*, B. VI. c. 99: οἱ δὲ Συρακούσιοι οὐκέτι ἐβούλοντο διακινδυνεύειν, ὑποτειγίξειν δὲ ἄμεινον ἐδόκει εἶναι ἢ ἡκεῖνοι ἔμελλον ἄξειν τὸ τεῖχος. “The Syracusans resolved no longer to hazard a battle; but it seemed more advisable to build an under (or transverse) wall in the direction where the *Athenians* were about to carry their wall.” He adds: εἰτείχιζον οὖν ἐξελθόντες ἀπὸ τῆς σφετέρως πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι, κατώθεν τοῦ κύκλου τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἄγοντες, τάσπε ἰλάας ἐκκόπτοντες τοῦ Τεμένους καὶ πύργους ξυλίνους καθιστάντες. “They therefore proceeded with the building, commencing from their city, carrying forward a transverse wall below the circumvallation of the Athenians, cutting down the olives of the sacred grove, and raising wooden towers.” —“The situation of this counterwork,” says Dr. Arnold,

“ has been much disputed. My own opinion is, that it was carried in a north-west direction, parallel to and under the southern cliff of Epipolæ, in that lower elevation half-way between Epipolæ and the plain, which was partly occupied at a later period by the quarter called Neapolis, and at the time of the siege by the sacred ground of Apollo Temenites, which the Syracusans had lately enclosed within their line of defence, for the express purpose of lengthening the line of the enemy's circumvallation. Thus of the three counterworks which the Syracusans attempted at different periods of the siege, the first was carried along the plateau or terrace of Neapolis ; the second at a still lower level, down in the very valley ; and the third was above the first, upon the slope of Epipolæ itself.”* I shall make no observations upon the line marked by Goëller in his map, which seems to be a very incorrect one, as it is obviously at variance with the historian's description ; and besides, he makes it commence from the wall round the Temenites, instead of from the city. There appear to me to be various reasons for suspecting the accuracy of the position assigned by Dr. Arnold to this counterwork. It is true, the Athenians intended to carry their lines of circumvallation from Trogilus across the slope of Epipolæ down to the great harbour. But the only demonstration they had yet made, was to extend them in the direction of Trogilus, which would have brought them very near the walls of the city on the *northern* side, where the danger was most imminent.

* See his Map.

It does not appear from the historian's description, that a single stone had as yet been laid down in the direction of the line assigned by Dr. Arnold; and, therefore, the wall which he supposes the Syracusans were building, could not be called a ὑποτείχισμα, or under wall. It would have been equally useless to have carried their wall up Epipolæ, because the Athenians had not yet commenced their works in that quarter, with the exception of Labdalum; and, in fact, never did carry them completely across the slope of the hill. They began, as has been already stated, in the low ground, carrying their wall northward. It was evidently the purpose of the Syracusans to prevent the Athenians from completing the blockade in that quarter; and they, therefore, began their wall *in the direction where the Athenians were about to carry theirs, viz. northwards, towards Trogilus.*

Without a particular knowledge of the ground, it is difficult to ascertain from what part of the city the transverse wall commenced, or the precise direction in which it was carried. As it was intended *to cut* the proposed Athenian line, it must have been to the northward of it, and evidently was so, because we find the historian stating, B. VII. c. 4, "that the Syracusans and their allies, after the arrival of Gylippus the Lacedemonian with reinforcements, commenced building a single wall through Epipolæ, proceeding upwards through the city, πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάτατον (τεῦχος) towards the cross wall." It seems clear from this passage that the Athenians had not destroyed the whole of the wall first built by the Syracusans, but only that part of it which ap-

proached their own lines, together with the palisades erected to protect the workmen. If they had begun it more to the south, there would have been no need of a new wall running up from the city in that quarter, which they afterwards built. Besides, if the Athenian lines had been begun to be formed "on the higher ground, on the slope or face of Epipolæ," according to Dr. Arnold, by what way would the Syracusans have marched to join Gylippus? They did not proceed up Epipolæ, nor on the southern side, but along the base of the hill in the opening between the Athenian lines, which evidently at that time did not reach the cliffs on the north side.*

After destroying a part of this counterwork, the Athenians resolved to send their fleet round to the great harbour, and, at the same time, to carry their lines from the cliffs of Epipolæ on the southern side, downwards across the low ground as far as the harbour. The Syracusans endeavoured to intersect this line by digging a trench and forming palisades across the marshy ground, somewhat similar to their works on the northern side. Their attempt was defeated by the Athenians, who took both the palisades and the trench, and drove the right wing of the Syracusans back to the city, while the left fled to the river Anapus, where they rallied, and put to flight a select body of Athenians who pursued them. In this skirmish, Lamachus, the colleague of Nicias, was slain, the only officer after the departure of Alcibiades who seems to have united enterprise with judgment. After

* The supposed direction of this *ἐνέσσωσιν τεῖχος*, which is also called *ὑποστεύχισμα*, will be seen on the accompanying map.

this repulse of the enemy, the Athenians soon completed a double line of circumvallation from Epipolæ to the shore, with the exception of a small part, close upon the beach; and in the mean time they seem to have paused in their operations on the north-west side of the town.

Nothing could show more clearly the incapacity of Nicias, now the sole Athenian general, for so important a command, than the neglect to fortify the heights of Epipolæ.* He knew that the Syracusans had sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth to beg assistance, and that Gylippus, a celebrated Spartan officer, was on his way with a reinforcement to join them. He supposed that Gylippus would attempt to enter Syracuse by sea, and never seems to have imagined that he would cross the island and enter by Epipolæ. If he had finished his lines on the northern side of the hill towards Trogilus, and fortified the heights at Euryelus, it would have been impossible for Gylippus to have forced an entrance, or for the Syracusans to have marched out to join him, as all the other points were sufficiently guarded. All that Nicias thought proper to do, was to erect a fort at Labdalum, at some distance in front of Euryelus, and not within view of the Athenian lines, into which he put an insufficient garrison. The slope of Epipolæ was still open, and by it the Syracusans, hearing of Gylippus' approach, marched out with a numerous body to meet him, having

* The indecision of Nicias became proverbial. Καὶ μὲν, says Aristophanes, *Av.* 689, μὰ τὸν Δί, οὐχὶ νυστάζειν ἔτι Ὀρεά' στίν ἡμῖν, οὐδὲ μιλλονικίζν.—μιλλονικίζν, to be as hesitating and slow as Nicias.

passed through the open space between the Athenian lines.* When they had united their forces, they advanced in order of battle, and ascended, without opposition, the heights of Euryelus by the same pass through which the Athenians had formerly reached it. They then descended the slope against the Athenian fortifications. Neither party seems to have been anxious to come to an engagement: but it was clearly the duty of Nicias to have hazarded one, as the Syracusan troops were so ill disciplined and unsteady that Gylippus thought it prudent to withdraw them to the height called *Temenites*, which seems to have been, not as Dr. Arnold imagines, "the cliff of Epipolæ, just above Neapolis," nor, as some other commentators have supposed, the eminence now called *Mongebellisi*, which would have placed them in the rear of the Athenians, but a rising rocky ground, at the extremity of the sacred grove, opposite to and adjoining the southern termination of the cliffs of Epipolæ. "It was at this period of the siege," says Dr. Arnold, "that the Syracusans commenced their third counter-work, which Thucydides describes as a single wall, carried up through Epipolæ in a cross direction."—"The direction of the wall," he says, "cannot be doubted; it was to be

* The historian does not inform us whether they passed through the space between the lines that reached to the base of Epipolæ on the south, and the commencement of those that were apparently begun about the middle of the slope towards the north; or at the northern extremity of these, in the space between the unfinished part and Trogilus. As they evidently did not ascend Epipolæ by Euryelus, but marched along the base of the hill on the north side, it is probable that they passed through the latter opening.

carried up the slope of Epipolæ, and pass to the northward of the finished part of the Athenian lines; thus effectually preventing the enemy from carrying their lines across Epipolæ and down to the seashore at Trogilus." The words of Thucydides are : *Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτείχιζον οἱ Συρακούσιοι καὶ οἱ ξυμμαχοὶ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν, ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀρξάμενοι ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον, τεῖχος ἀπλοῦν*. I have examined the passage here quoted with as much attention and care as possible, and also the opinions of several commentators, and I am convinced it will not bear the interpretation put upon it by Dr. Arnold and others. In his note upon it the Doctor says : " They, *i. e.* the Syracusans, began to carry a single wall (the Athenian circumvallation was a double wall,* c. 2, § 4), up the hill of Epipolæ in a cross direction, that is, to cross the line of the Athenian wall,"—" as we had *ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος* in a similar sense, VI. 99, § 3." Goëller† seems to have formed a more correct notion of the passage, though his account is not very clear : "*i. e.* πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἀπλοῦν ἐτείχιζον, ut τεῖχος bis cogitetur, estque τὸ τεῖχος ἐγκάρσιον illud τεῖχος Syracusanorum, quod captum per Athenienses vidimus, VI. 100. A Syracusanis igitur præter prius, vel potius versus prius ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος nunc murus alius perducī cœpit, ne hostes sibi exitum ex urbe intercluderent. Non poterant novum murum aliter dirigere, nisi versus murum priorem, ut qui transversus esset, nisi forte vellent

* Dr. Arnold has confounded the wall built by the Athenians on the south towards the great harbour, which was double, with the wall on the northern side, which is nowhere called double.

† Second Edition.

eum παράλληλον cum priore facere, id quod insanum fuisset.” It is impossible that the words ἐτεείχιζον — πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἀπλοῦν can bear the meaning of “they built a single wall in a cross direction,” because the preposition πρὸς with the accusative, preceded by an active verb, must signify *towards, in the direction towards some point*, and not *in a cross direction*. Dr. Arnold seems to have fallen both into the geographical and grammatical mistake by making the ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος, which the Syracusans first built, “to run along,” as he says, “the terrace of Neapolis, *i. e.* to the south of Epipolæ,” and not to the northward, as has been already described.

The Syracusans, by commencing their wall from the city upwards through Epipolæ, had *three* objects in view:— 1. To prevent the Athenians from carrying their line of circumvallation across the base of Epipolæ; 2. To defend their intended counterwork, by preventing the Athenians from turning it in their rear; and lastly, To counterwork them in the direction of Trogilus. This part of their line the Athenians seem to have neglected while they were finishing that on the southern side. Thucydides says, B. VII. 22: τῷ δὲ ἄλλῳ τοῦ κύκλου πρὸς τὸν Τρωγίλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν θάλασσαν λίθοι τε παραβεβλημένοι τῷ πλεονὶ ἤδη ἦσαν, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ καὶ ἡμίεργα, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐξεργασμένα κατελείπετο· παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν αἱ Συράκουσαι ἦλθον κινδύνου. “On the other part of their line towards Trogilus to the other sea, stones had already been laid down for the greater part, and some parts were left half, and others wholly finished: to such a state of danger had Syracuse been exposed.” They now began to

turn their attention anew to this other part; and in order to prevent them, Gylippus began to carry on a counterwork, proceeding from the city upwards, a little to the south of the Athenian wall, and then in an oblique direction across a part of the slope of Epipolæ, towards the *ἰγκάρσιον τεῖχος*, which the Syracusans had formerly raised, and which had not been entirely destroyed. If I understand Dr. Arnold aright, he seems to think that this *ἀπλοῦν τεῖχος* was both to be carried up the slope of Epipolæ, and to pass to the northward of the Athenian lines: which could not possibly be, if the account already given of the place where these lines commenced be correct. Besides, it is clear that the wall was not intended to be *ἰγκάρσιον*, i. e. to cut through the projected line of the Athenians, but that it ran in a *parallel* direction with theirs. This is evident from what the historian says in B. VII. c. 5: 'Ομὲν Γύλιππος ἄμα μὲν ἐτείχιζε τὸ διὰ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τεῖχος, τοῖς λίθοις χρώμενος οὗς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι προσπαρεβάλοντο σφίσιν· ἄμα δὲ παρέτασεν ἐξάγων αἰὲ πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος τοὺς Συρακουσίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους. The expression πρὸ τοῦ τειχίσματος means "before his fortification;" and then he adds: καὶ ἐν χερσὶ γενόμενοι ἐμάχοντο μετὰ τῶν τειχισμάτων, "and then, having joined battle, they fought between the lines." But how could they be said to fight *between the lines*, if the counterwork of the Syracusans was a wall run straight up to intersect the Athenian lines? Gylippus apologizes for the defeat which the Syracusans sustained, by taking the blame upon himself, as he had drawn them up *ἐντὸς λίαν τῶν τειχῶν*, "too much within the lines," where their cavalry could not act.

In preparing for another engagement, Thucydides observes, *καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος τοὺς μὲν ὀπλίτας ἔξω τῶν τειχῶν μάλλον ἢ πρότερον προεξαγαγὼν ξυνέμισγεν αὐτοῖς· τοὺς δ' ἰππέας καὶ τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς ἐκ πλαγίου τάξας τῶν Ἀθηναίων, κατὰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν, ἥ τῶν τειχῶν ἀμφοτέρων αἱ ἐργασίαι ἔληγον· καὶ προσβαλόντες οἱ ἰππῆς ἐν τῇ μαχρῇ τῷ εὐωνύμῳ κέρει τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ὑπερκατ' αὐτοὺς ἦν, ἔτρεψαν.* “And Gylippus, having led his troops more without the lines than formerly, joined battle with them, and having stationed his cavalry and darters on the flank of the Athenians, in the open space where the works of both lines stopped; and the cavalry, having attacked during the battle the left wing of the Athenians which was opposed to them, put it to flight.”* But if any doubt could remain as to the direction of the wall which the Syracusans were raising, it will be removed, I should suppose, by the following expressions: *καὶ τῇ ἐπιούσῃ νυκτὶ ἔφθασαν παροικοδομήσαντες, καὶ παρελθόντες τὴν τῶν οἰκοδομίαν.* “And in the following night they (the Syracusans) got the start of them in building

* Dr. Arnold, in a note, remarks: “The Syracusans fronted towards the west; their cavalry, therefore, being on their right, was on the north of their line; and it was the northern side of Epipolæ which presented the greatest extent of clear ground, the finished part of the Athenian line being on the southern side, towards the cliffs looking to the south.” It appears quite evident that the Athenians never attempted to fortify that part of Epipolæ at all. They seem to have commenced their line towards the north, about the middle of the slope; their first object being to shut out the Syracusans from the Port of Trogilus. They no doubt intended to draw their lines quite across, so as to meet the double wall already built from the cliffs of Epipolæ to the great harbour; but this they never accomplished. This, I think, is quite evident from the night march of Gylippus to attack the forts at Plemyrion: for by no other way could he have marched his troops to make the attack in the morning. See *Thucyd.* VII. 22, 23.

their parallel line, and passed the building of the Athenians.” The preposition *παρά*, in composition with both participles, shows clearly, with the first, that the Syracusan wall was built *parallel* to that of the Athenians, and with the other, that it was carried in the same direction and *past* it. The same kind of expressions are employed by Nicias in his letter to the Athenians. In consequence of getting before, or outflanking the Athenians, the historian subjoins the following remark, c. 6 : ὥστε μηκέτι μήτε αὐτοὶ κωλύεσθαι ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ἐκείνους τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπεστερηκέναι, εἰ καὶ κρατοῖεν, μὴ ἂν ἴτι σφᾶς ἀποτειχίσαι. “ So that they themselves could no longer be stopped by them, and they wholly deprived the *Athenians*, even if they should prove victorious, henceforth of the power of circumvallating them.”

It is then stated, that upon the arrival of the ships of the Corinthians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians, the crews assisted the Syracusans in completing the rest of the wall, καὶ ξυντεείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ Συρακουσίων, μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους—B. VII. c. 7. This passage has given occasion to various comments :—“ Some,” says Dr. Arnold, “ have supposed it to be the Athenian line of circumvallation, which was *ἐγκάρσιον* to the counterwork ;” while Goëller understands it of the counterwork itself, translating the words ξυντεείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν, &c. “ prius absolutis muri extremis, intermedia quoque adificando ope Corinthiorum etc. expleverunt.” Dr. Arnold himself is of the former opinion, for in his note he says, μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους, “ as far as the line of the cross wall of the Athenians, which crossed the line of the Sicilian (Syracusan) cross wall at right

angles;" and then he refers his readers to the memoir and map of Syracuse. If the observations already made respecting the direction of the Athenian lines be at all correct, it is impossible that the wall of the Athenians could be at right angles with the Syracusan cross wall, when it is evident that the two were run in parallel lines. The historian nowhere calls the Athenian wall ἐγκάσσιον; and it appears to me that both the Editors have mistaken the meaning of the terms and the position of the wall, supposing it to have been on the southern side of the Athenian lines; for Goëller says, in a note to his 2d Edition, "Syracusani, opinor, postquam inde ab urbe paulatim opus produserant, relicto hinc inde locis natura munitionibus intervallo, quo citius ultra κύκλον pervenirent, extrema muri prius absolverant, Quibus absolutis intermedia quoque ope Corinthiorum et reliquorum, qui modo advenierant, ædificando expleverunt. Quare Corinthii etc. dicuntur ædificationem juvisse μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκασίου τείχους. It is quite clear that the Syracusans, having already passed the Athenian wall, must have been anxious to carry their line of defence onwards to the transverse wall, as a *point d'appui*, which would effectually prevent the enemy from an attack on the side of the city next Trogilus, where it was probably weakest.

The next important event that requires elucidation is the unsuccessful attack made by Demosthenes, soon after his arrival with reinforcements, to carry the Syracusan counter-work upon the slope of Epipolæ, which he rightly considered the key of Syracuse. It would appear that the

Athenians, previous to the arrival of Demosthenes, having found themselves counterworked by the Syracusans, had abandoned the lines they had formed across a part of the slope of Epipolæ towards the north. Their opponents, perceiving the importance of securing possession of the heights, had formed *three* encampments at a short distance from each other on the ridge and slope, and an outwork (τείχισμα) behind, to guard against a sudden attack. Demosthenes was aware of these defences, but he thought, if he could get possession of the ascent, and force the enemy's lines, he would thus put an end to the war. He accordingly made preparations for assaulting the παρατείχισμα of the Syracusans by a *coup de main*, in which he was unsuccessful. It would appear from the historian's account, though it is not very clear, that Gylippus and the Syracusans had not only completed their line to the north, so as to connect it with the ἐγνάρασιον τείχος, but had also carried it southwards, probably joining it with the προτείχισμα, which had been constructed some time before for the defence of Temenites; or, if any part was left unfinished, it was likely protected by the nature of the ground. Demosthenes could not remain before the Syracusan lines, because the enemy were encamped behind him, and might have attacked his rear, while those within the walls would have assailed him in front. His only chance of success, therefore, was to take the Syracusans in the rear, who were posted on the verge of the hill, drive them within their own lines, and thus establish a complete blockade. The historian says that he advanced after the first watch, along with his colleagues

Eurymedon and Menander, towards Epipolæ, and arrived on the heights in the direction of Euryelus, where the former army had at first ascended, without being observed by the outposts. Some suppose, from the particular expressions used by Thucydides, *καὶ ἐπειδὴ ἐγένοντο πρὸς αὐταῖς* (*ταῖς Ἐπιπόλαις*) *κατὰ τὸν Εὐρύηλον, ἧπερ καὶ ἡ πρότερον στρατία τὸ πρῶτον ἀνέβη*, that Demosthenes must have crossed the slope of Epipolæ and proceeded by the same pass through which the Athenians had formerly ascended. This is not at all probable; as the distance between the Syracusan lines and their nearest encampment on the slope must have been small: and, although the troops marched during the night, they could not likely have passed in that direction without giving an alarm. I am, therefore, inclined to agree with Dr. Arnold, that “the course of the army was at first inland in a westerly direction, till it turned to the right to begin the ascent by some of those roads or paths which probably then as now led to Epipolæ from the upper parts of the valley of the Anapus.” He adds: “The surprise was complete; the Athenians gained the summit of the ridge unperceived; attacked and carried immediately the fortified post of the Syracusans close to Euryelus, and then hastened to descend the slope, turn the end of the counterwork, and attack the rear, where it was without defence.” I confess I do not understand the learned Editor’s observations in the next paragraph, when he says: “When they reached the extremity of the counterwork, they encountered the party of the six hundred Syracusans who had been stationed there to guard it,” &c. The whole of this description ap-

pears to me to be totally at variance with the historian's account of the Syracusan defences, and the progress of the Athenians. What are we to understand by a counterwork, but a line of defence opposed to the approaches of an enemy? These had been formerly attempted by Demosthenes without success; and these, it is plain from the historian's description, he never reached, in this well-planned, but unsuccessful expedition. Having ascended Epipolæ in the direction of Euryelus, he came in the rear of the whole of the Syracusan defences; took first the *τείχισμα*, then advanced against the encampments, α ἦν, says Thucydides, ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία, ἐν μὲν τῶν Συρακουσίων, ἐν δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Σικελιωτῶν, ἐν δὲ τῶν ξυμμάχων. The six hundred Syracusans held the first encampment: to them the fugitives from the fort announced the approach of the enemy. These attempted in vain to resist their attack. Their position, which, in all the editions of Thucydides I have had an opportunity of consulting, is called *παρατείχισμα*, ought, I am confident, to be denominated *προτείχισμα*, as the *first advanced post* which Demosthenes attacked; and which, as the historian states, was occupied by the Syracusans. This they took without much opposition, the garrison having fled at their approach.* Then (says the historian) οἱ δὲ Συρακουσίοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι καὶ ὁ Γύλιππος καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐβόηθουν ἐκ τῶν προτειχισμάτων. What are we to understand by

* This, I think, is confirmed by a reading in some of the MSS. omitted in the quotation given above, and which Dr. Arnold thinks genuine: In reference to the camps on the hill, Thucydides says: α ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν τρία (ἐν προτειχίσμασιν, front works.)

the τῶν προτειχισμάτων, and how are they to be distinguished from the παρατείχισμα mentioned above? To me it seems obvious that the prepositions ought to change places: the παρατείχισμα, as I have already remarked, must be considered the προτείχισμα, or the advanced post, garrisoned by the Syracusans alone; while the προτειχισμάτων must be understood of those lines formed for the defence of the north-west part of the city, which ran parallel to the lines of circumvallation drawn by the Athenians, and are always denominated by the historian παρατειχίσματα, B. VII. c. 43. These Demosthenes attempted to carry previous to the night attack; and these, there can be no doubt, were occupied by Gylippus and the Syracusans with their allies, to resist another attack that might be meditated. It does not appear to me that the Athenians ever reached this counterwork. They carried the προτείχισμα, defended by the six hundred Syracusans; they repulsed Gylippus, who had advanced with the Syracusans and their allies from the παρατειχίσματα, and then, falling into disorder, they were arrested in their progress and put to flight by the Bæotians, who, in all probability, occupied the *third* encampment, or the one lowest on the slope, which (says the historian) was occupied by the allies, ἐν δὲ τῶν θυμμάτων. If they had turned the counterwork, as Dr. Arnold supposes, and got to the base of Epipolæ, they would not have been obliged, even when thrown into disorder, to have cast themselves headlong down the cliffs, but would have easily found their way to the Athenian camp. But it is evident from the historian's account that the rout took place near the verge of

the slope, because he says, "some part of the army had just ascended, and others were still advancing." How any one could have supposed that the three camps were formed immediately under the walls of the city (or of the newly enclosed district of Temenites) appears to me quite incomprehensible, especially as it was distinctly stated by the historian that the *three encampments were ἐπὶ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν*, and that many of the Athenians, when pursued, threw themselves down the cliffs and perished, *σενῆς οὔσης τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν πάλιν καταβάσεως*. If they had been as near the city as has been represented, how could numbers of them have missed their way to the Athenian camp? Thucydides says: *οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἤκοντες εἰσὶν οἱ διαμαρτόντες τῶν ὁδῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν ἐπλανήθησαν* * οὕς, ἐπειδὴ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, οἱ ἰππῆς τῶν Συρακουσίων περιελάσαντες διέφθαιραν, c. 44.

After this signal failure, the Athenians gave up all hopes of taking Syracuse, and endeavoured to secure their retreat by sea, by an attack on the enemy's fleet. They were equally unsuccessful in this attempt. Their navy was destroyed; and they had now no other chance of escape than by raising the siege, and marching across the island to some friendly State. Weakness, infatuation, and irresolution seem to have ruled their counsels. Instead of commencing an immediate and rapid retreat, before the Syracusans had time to block up the roads and passes, they allowed themselves to be deceived by the enemy, and did not move from their camp till the third day after their defeat. Harassed at every step by Gylippus and the Syracusans, oppressed by hunger and thirst, and at last completely surrounded,

they were obliged to surrender at discretion ;—and thus terminated an expedition, conceived in folly, conducted without skill or energy, and ending at last in total ruin.

Φασί γὰρ δυσβουλίαν
Τῇ δὲ τῇ πόλει προσεῖναι.

Aristoph. Nubes. 583.

